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Abstract
This paper evaluates the effects of restricted land use rights on aggregate productivity using micro-
level data within a quantitative model. In particular, I exploit the Rice Land Designation Policy
in Vietnam, which forces farmers to produce rice on almost 45% of land plots. I use digitized
versions of Vietnam’s Local Land Use Atlas and Global Agro-Ecological Zones database to construct
a micro-spatial dataset that shapes the model features and allows me to compare the restricted
against a counterfactual efficient allocation. The main findings suggest that eliminating all land use
restrictions leads to an 8.03% increase in real GDP per capita. While misallocation in agriculture
has been studied extensively, the paper highlights a novel source of misallocation also prevalent in
other countries such as China, Myanmar, and Uzbekistan.
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1 Introduction
There is a strong consensus in prior studies that the lack of secure rights to land is a constraint
to efficient resource allocation, thus lowering agricultural productivity.1 However, much of
the focus has been placed on land transfer rights (sell, rent, bequeath, mortgage), and little
attention has been given to land use rights. Focusing on the latter under-explored area, this
paper presents the effects of restricted land use rights on productivity and resource allocation.
To do so, I exploit a particular type of land use restrictions, the Rice Land Designation Policy
in Vietnam (RLDP)2, as a natural setting for quantitative analysis.
Starting around 1986, Vietnam began to shift from a centrally planned to a market economy
with a series of market-oriented reforms. In agriculture, privatizing production and grant-
ing land rights have created a significant incentive for farmers to allocate their resources
more efficiently, leading to as much as 50% of TFP gain during the 1990s (World Bank,
1998). Nevertheless, Vietnamese farmers are still subject to remnants from past institutional
arrangements. A notable case is the existence of RLDP, a centralized land use planning
system forcing farmers to grow rice on their lands. This policy plays a significant role in
supporting the National Food Security program, the objective of which is to achieve national
food self-sufficiency. In 2011, the Vietnamese government established a target of 3.8 million
hectares, i.e. 39% of the total agricultural land, to be devoted to rice production by 2020
(Resolution 17/2011/QH13).3
This paper explores the extent to which the practice of RLDP to stimulate rice production can
generate distortions in both land use and labor allocation, thus lowering productivity at the
aggregate level. To quantify the distortionary effects of RLDP, I develop a two-sector model
comprising three final goods. Two of the three final goods are produced in the agricultural
sector, namely rice and non-rice crops (other agricultural commodities). The third final
good is produced in the non-agricultural sector by a representative firm. Individuals with
heterogeneous ability can be farmers or workers. In agriculture, the production unit is a farm.
Each farmer maximizes profit by choosing which crop to produce and how much quality-
1 Examples include the works of Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a), Adamopoulos et al. (2017), Chen
(2017), Gottlieb and Grobovsek (2019).
2 The term Rice Land Designation Policy is first used in Giesecke et al. (2013). In Vietnamese, this land
policy is known as ‘Dat Chuyen Trong Lua’, which is translated to Specialized Land for Rice Production.
3 The old target was approximately 4.2 million hectares (almost 45% of the total agricultural land).
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adjusted land to rent. With reference to RLDP, a fraction of agricultural land is restricted to
rice production only. Land characteristics (e.g. quality and restriction status) are taken as
given. In non-agriculture, the representative firm requires only effective labor as an input.
To quantify the effects of the restrictions, I exploit both household-level surveys (Vietnam
Household Living Standards Survey) and spatial datasets (Local Land Use Atlas and Global
Agro-Ecological Zones) to account for heterogeneity in labor and land characteristics. The
primary results concern the effects of entirely removing RLDP on aggregate productivity and
resource reallocation. To do so, I compare the current economy of Vietnam to a hypothetical
economy where RLDP does not exist.
My approach to quantifying the misallocation effects of RLDP builds upon the recent
macro-development literature that studies the impacts of micro-level distortions on aggregate
outcomes. However, the paper differs from others in two main aspects. First, I consider a
specific type of distortionary policy (land use restrictions) in a particular context (Vietnam).
Second, the model incorporates the spatial characteristics of land, which is essential to
agricultural production. The main findings suggest that eliminating all restrictions coming
from RLDP leads to an 8.03% increase in real GDP per capita, a 40.68% gain in agricultural
labor productivity, a rise of 37.89% in agricultural TFP, a 5.89% reduction in agricultural
employment, and a 6.26% increase in average farm size.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief discussion of related literature
and background information on RLDP. Section 3 outlines the model used in the quantitative
analysis. Section 4 defines the equilibrium and discusses mechanisms of resource reallocation.
Section 5 connects the model and data. Section 6 presents the main results along with a
series of robustness checks and extensions. Then, Section 7 concludes the study.
2 Literature Review and Background
2.1 Related Literature
This research contributes to the emerging literature on institutions, misallocation and
aggregate productivity. Notably, I connect the misallocation and institution-growth literature
by investigating the distortionary consequences of a specific land policy, RLDP of Vietnam.
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to exploit micro-level data in quantifying
the aggregate effects of this type of institution which involves “forced” production. The main
strands of literature that the paper is related to are as follows.
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The first and broader strand of literature attempts to explain productivity losses in agricul-
ture through the lens of resources misallocation caused by specific policies.4 For example,
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a) show that the Philippines 1988 land reform imposing a
ceiling on land holdings lowers farm size by 34% and agricultural productivity by 17%. Study-
ing the case of China, Adamopoulos et al. (2017) document that Chinese land institutions
can account for approximately 46% of agricultural productivity loss. Chen (2017) finds that
land titling can raise agricultural productivity by up to 82.5%, with 42% coming from land
reallocation and the remaining stemming from efficient-occupational choice. Gottlieb and
Grobovsek (2019) report that removing the communal land tenure system lowers agricultural
employment by 19% and increases aggregate output by 7%. In this paper, I employ micro-data
to shape important features of the model and to perform quantitative experiments. Therefore,
my work can also be related to the recent literature on macro-development including Hsieh
and Klenow (2009), Gollin et al. (2014), Buera et al. (2014), among many others. However,
I differ from them in two ways. First, I focus on a specific type of institution in a particular
context. Second, I incorporate the spatial characteristics of agricultural land into the model,
allowing me to account for spatial distributions of land quality and restrictions.
The paper is also related to the existing literature on RLDP. Nielsen (2003) employs a
computable trade model (GTAP) to stimulate the effect of freeing 5% of the rice land area.
This particular relaxation raises production of the other crops by about 3.8%, which in turn
leads to a gain of $52 million in welfare. Giesecke et al. (2013) apply another computable
general equilibrium model (MONASH) to perform their analysis across industries. Their
simulated results suggest that removing RLDP can increase real GDP and consumption
per annum between 2011 and 2030 by 0.27% and 0.39% respectively. The analyses in both
papers are conducted at the industry level, and the gains are driven by differences in land
rental rates between rice and non-rice industries. Put it differently, their gains come from
reducing the cross-industry dispersion in the marginal product of land by switching a fraction
of homogeneous land from rice to non-rice production. Consequently, these studies do
not account for heterogeneity at the lower levels of aggregation (i.e. individuals and land
plots). The growing literature on misallocation shows that much of the losses in productivity
4 Without specifying underlining sources of misallocation, some studies emphasize equating marginal products
to quantify the overall misallocation. Notably, if inputs were allocated efficiently, agricultural TFP would
increase by a factor of 3.6 in Malawi (Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis, 2017), and by a factor of 2.4 in
Ethiopia (Chen et al., 2017).
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is actually due to distortions across individual producers (see, for example, the seminal
works of Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). Therefore, my
study offers a distinct but complementary explanation of the effects of RLDP by accounting
for heterogeneities at the lowest level of aggregation. In particular, my model allows for
the productivity heterogeneity of farmers, spatial distribution of land suitability, spatial
distribution of RLDP restrictions, and their interrelationship.5
2.2 Major Reforms in Vietnam’s Agricultural Land Policy
Vietnam’s era of central planning is generally regarded to have ended in 1986 as the state
started to introduce a series of market-oriented agricultural and industrial reforms. In
agriculture, a critical reform was the enactment of the Directive No.10 in 1988, which
abolished collective farming and recognized the household as an autonomous unit in the
economy. With the issuance of the Directive, parcels of agricultural land were allocated to
families along with certificates of land use rights (CLUR) for 10-15 years.6 For the first time,
farmers were granted the right to make their own decisions related to the sale of outputs,
or the purchases and uses of inputs; thus offering a significant incentive for agricultural
production.
A drawback of Directive No.10 was that households could not trade their land use rights.
A subsequent agricultural reform, the Law on Land 1993, granted farmers five fundamental
land rights. These rights comprise transfer, exchange, lease, inheritance, and mortgage rights.
Since then, the process of land allocation has been steadily proceeding, along with several
adjustments to the Law on Land in 1998, 2001, 2003 and 2008 to encourage the development
of land markets. However, the allocated lands remain the state’s property and must be
returned to the state when farmers stop using them. Technically, farmers are only able to
5 In addition, the paper can be linked to studies that provide microeconomic evidence on the effects of RLDP
and land rights in Vietnam. For example, Markussen et al. (2011) find that RLDP restrictions do not
affect household income due to the compensation by the local authorities, but farmers tend to switch to
other crops when restrictions are lifted. Do and Iyer (2008) show that progress in land titling raises the
production of multiyear crops and household labor supply in nonfarm work. Menon et al. (2017) document
that land use rights held exclusively by women or jointly by couples result in lower household vulnerability
to poverty and increased household expenditures as well as women’s self-employment.
6 A CLUR can be thought of as a license that permits a recipient to use his/her allocated plot of land. Detail
information of the assigned plot is printed on the CLUR issued to its operator including plot code, address,
size, blueprint, acquirement source, expiration date, land use purpose, and personal information of the
operator. The section of land use purpose in CLUR, in which crop choice restrictions are clearly stated (if
any), is the focus of this paper.
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transfer, exchange, lease, bequeath, or mortgage the right to use the land (for a limited time),
not the land itself.
The reforms in Vietnam’s land policy were partially motivated by years of struggling with food
security. Before the reforms, the country experienced severe food shortages, and domestic
subsistence consumption mostly relied on the former USSR’s food aid. By 1988, malnutrition
became a widespread phenomenon, 3 million people faced starvation, 12 million people were
short of food, and million tons of rice had to be imported to fight hunger. Since the issuance
of Directive No.10 and Law on Land 1993, privatizing production and granting land rights
have created a significant incentive for farmers to allocate labor and land more efficiently,
leading to as much as 50% of TFP gain during the peak of the reform period. Such remarkable
improvement is underlined by the successful transformation from a rice-importer to become
the second-largest rice-exporter in 1997 (for an in-depth review, see World Bank, 1998).
2.3 Land Use Restrictions and RLDP in Vietnam
Although the series of extensive reforms has remarkably changed the landscape of Vietnam’s
agriculture, the state has continued to direct policies towards securing food supply rather
than improving the rural living standard. One of the most prevalent practices is to constrain
farmers’ right to choose which crop to cultivate. A dominant type of this land use restriction
is RLDP, the subject of this research which requires farmers to grow rice on their land. The
objective of producing enough rice to ensure national food sources has been widely stated
and repeated.7
It is crucial to understand how RLDP is crafted. First, the restriction quota (e.g., 3.8 million
hectares by 2020) is established through the 10-year land use plan by the central government.
After the aggregate target is set, following a top-down approach, the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment governs the restriction process by splitting the total amount
among provincial, district and commune levels of its administration. At the lowest level,
communal land offices are responsible for creating detailed land use plans for each household
7 For example, in 2008, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued Resolution 26/NQ-TW on
agriculture, farmers and rural affairs, expressing its determination of keeping land permanently under
rice to ensure national food security. In 2009, the Party Politburo approved the nation’s food security
project aiming to keep rice cultivation area at 3.8 million hectares by 2030, said Director Nguyen Tri
Ngoc of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (the announcement is available in English at
www.vietnammarkets.com/vietnamnews.php?nid=3886). Two years later, the project was finalized by the
National Assembly and officially part of the Land Use Master Plan up to 2020 (Resolution 17/2011/QH13).
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in their commune, parcel by parcel and year to year. The specific plan is formally documented
in CLUR issued to the farmers. Any adjustment (e.g. renewal or new issuance of land and
CLUR) is regulated in compliance with the quota set by the central government.
According to Article 74.1 of the Law on Land 2003, the state plays a leading role in
implementing RLDP by providing protection of specialized land for wet rice cultivation and
preventing illegal conversions to other purposes. Land users are required to participate in
RLDP. Article 74.2 asserts that the holders of the specialized land for wet rice cultivation
must be responsible for the land and not convert it to other purposes such as perennial crops,
aquaculture, and others. There is a strong incentive for farmers to comply with their assigned
land plans because violating the state’s direction may lead to land or crop confiscation.
Furthermore, evaluation by the local authorities is critical for farmers to renew their current
CLUR or apply for other ones. To get farmers involved in RLDP, the state provides subsidies
to rice cultivation at the expense of the production of other crops. For example, irrigation
systems, credits, fertilizers, and agricultural services are provided preferentially to rice farmers
(World Bank, 1998).8
2.4 Land Use Restrictions in Other Countries
Other countries also have such rules in place in varying degrees of intensity. Beyond Vietnam,
a significant portion of farmers is also coerced into growing rice in Myanmar. According
to Chapter X of the country’s Farmland Law 2012, farmers are prohibited from growing
alternative crops without the permission of the government. Exploiting within-village
variations in an empirical study, Kurosaki (2008) finds that being restricted to growing
rice is associated with a decrease of 8.3% in crop income of Burmese farmers. China has
a system called “zeren tian” (responsibility land), in which parcels of agricultural land are
allocated to households on the basis of household size and ability to engage in agriculture.
However, farmers need to deliver a mandatory quota of grain at a below-market price to
the authorities in exchange for use rights. Responsibility land accounts for 70% of total
farmland in 2008 (Gao et al., 2017). In several Central Asian countries, such as Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, the state still owns the land and severely restricts many
farmers to growing cotton through production quotas. The combination of low incomes and
the compulsion to produce cotton in these Central Asian countries leads to many social issues,
8 In Appendix B, I show that my model is affected only by RLDP, not other types of distortions.
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including widespread child labor and forced labor (ILO, 2015). In Appendix C, I document
several nationwide policies in developing countries that directly place restrictions on land
use. Policy titles, brief descriptions, and effective dates are included. While not mentioned,
regional policies and those that indirectly affect land use (e.g. crop-specific seeds and fertilizer
subsidies) can also alter crop choices.9
3 Model
I consider a static economy in which three final goods are produced, namely rice, non-rice (all
other crops), and a non-agricultural product. The first two are produced in the agricultural
sector by heterogeneous farms, and the third good is produced in the non-agricultural sector
by a representative firm. In the model, individuals with heterogeneous ability can choose to
work as farmers in the agricultural sector or wage workers in the non-agricultural sector.
In agriculture, farmers require land to produce. However, a fraction of land is subject
to RLDP, i.e. reserved for rice production only. Consequently, RLDP creates resource
misallocation through two channels. First, it prevents restricted land from being optimally
used, decreasing land productivity. Second, it distorts the allocation of labor by reducing the
number of workers and increasing the number of farmers.
Two essential features of the model are built on previous studies. First, in the spirit of
Restuccia et al. (2008), I model the mechanism that misallocation in agriculture can lower
the share of the non-agricultural workers to satisfy subsistence consumption. Second, I
incorporate a theoretical contribution of Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) in modeling
individual choices of occupation.10 In particular, I borrow a key implication of their model in
which the movement of labor out of agriculture reduces the average ability of farmers, thus
dampening the gain in agricultural TFP under RLDP relaxation. I describe the model in
more detail below.
9 For example, the state of Ebonyi (Nigeria) set-aside 50,000 ha of land across its local government areas
for rice farming in 2016. The Government of Bangladesh allocates a budget of 5 million USD to provide
fertilizers to farmers who grow rice in 2011.
10 Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) quantify the effect of firm-size restriction in India (The Small Scale
Reservation Laws). In a calibrated version of their model, they find that eliminating these laws increases
output per worker by 2% and the overall TFP by 0.75%.
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3.1 Endowment Description
There are N individuals in the economy. Adopted from Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas
(2014), I assume that individuals are differentiated by their ability z ∈ R+ and an idiosyncratic
tax distortion τ ∈ [0, 1] on non-agricultural income. This distortion serves as an individual-
specific barrier to mobility out of agriculture and is not involved in production function. The
set {z, τ} is drawn from a cumulative distribution function H(z, τ). Individuals supply their
labor inelastically and choose to work one of the two mutually exclusive jobs: (i) farmers
maximize profit from operating farms, and (ii) workers work for a representative firm in the
non-agricultural sector.
The spatial distribution of agricultural land is represented by a collection of parcels indexed
by j ∈ J . These parcels are heterogeneous in size (l), two-dimensional productivity in rice
and non-rice production {sR, sO}, and restriction status (δ). The effective units of a parcel in
cultivating a crop is its size multiplied by its crop-specific productivity. For example, the
effective units of parcel j in cultivating rice is ERj = lj × sRj, and in growing other crops is
EOj = lj × sOj. Besides, the indicator δj takes a value of one if parcel j is subject to RLDP
(i.e. reserved for rice production), and zero otherwise.
Farmers can rent a fraction of a parcel, multiple parcels, or any combination to produce either
rice or other crops to maximize their profits. As shown later in this section, the optimal crop
choice on a parcel is jointly determined by its two-dimensional suitability and common crop
prices.11 However, RLDP-restrictions prevent the optimal allocation, giving rise to both land
and labor misallocation.
3.2 Technology and Production
Agriculture Sector - The production unit in agriculture is a farmer that needs to incorporate
her ability to decide how many effective units of land to rent and which crop to cultivate.
Here, I assume that each farmer produces only one crop and may use both restricted and
unrestricted land to do so. Let us consider a farmer i endowed with ability zi. If the farmer
chooses to produce rice, she rents eRi effective units of land. Her real output in producing
rice (yR) is given by,
yR(zi) = κz
1−α
i e
α
Ri (1)
11 Land suitability and land productivity are used interchangeably in the paper because the former term is
widely adopted in prior studies.
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Analogously, if the farmer decides to produce other crops, she rents eOi effective units of
land.12 Her real output in producing other crops (yO) can be expressed as follows,
yO(zi) = κz
1−α
i e
α
Oi (2)
where the relative importance of land in production α ∈ (0, 1) governs the production
functions in producing both rice and other crops. The constant term κ−1 = αα(1 − α)1−α
is here to simplify expressions later on. Note that I do not impose any limitation on the
relationship between {eRi, eOi} and {ERj, EOj}. Thus, farmers are allowed to rent a fraction
of a parcel, multiple parcels, or any possible combination to meet their demand.
In the model, RLDP restrictions happen at the parcel-level, not farm-level (further discussion
is provided in Section 3.4). Here, farmers solve the usual profit maximization problem. I let
{qR, qO} depict the unit costs of an effective unit of land in producing rice and other crops
respectively. Farmer i’s profit maximization problem in producing rice is given by,
πR(zi) = max
eR
{
pRκz
1−α
i e
α
Ri − qReRi
}
(3)
with {pR, pO} are the prices of rice and non-rice crops. First order conditions imply,
πR(zi) = zi
(
p
1/α
R
qR
) α
1−α
(4)
Similarly, if she chooses to produce other crops, her profit is given by,
πO(zi) = zi
(
p
1/α
O
qO
) α
1−α
(5)
Non-Agriculture Sector - Since the focus is the agricultural sector, I keep production in
the non-agriculture simple. The output is produced by a representative firm with access to
constant returns to scale technology. To produce, this firm requires only effective labor as an
12 Ideally, I want parcels of land to be discrete. However, for analytical tractability, I am assuming that
agricultural land is continuous.
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input. The production function takes the following form,
YM =
∫
i∈NM
zidi (6)
where YM is the total amount of non-agricultural output produced and NM is the set of
workers (the set of farmers is then NA). The representative firm maximizes profit by deciding
how many efficiency units of labor to hire. Denoting w and pM the unit prices of efficient
labor and non-agricultural good respectively, firm optimization implies w = pM . Thus, the
representative firm pays a worker with ability zi an amount of zipM .
Next, I incorporate the idiosyncratic distortion τi into the model as a non-agricultural income
tax of rate [1− τi] for working in the non-agricultural sector. This distortion is a wedge in
the occupational decision between being a farmer and a non-agricultural worker. In addition
to being excluded from the production function, the idiosyncratic distortion allows me to
reproduce two important targets, including: (i) the distribution of farm value-added, and (ii)
the sectoral gap in labor productivity. The net income of an individual i if she chooses to be
a worker is then given by (1− τi)zipM ≡ w˜(zi, τi).
3.3 Labor Allocation
I now discuss the allocation of labor across sectors. The individuals choose between one
of the two mutually exclusive jobs: farmer and non-agricultural worker. In addition, if an
individual decides to become a farmer, she can further choose to produce either rice or other
crops. Her optimal occupational choice is the most profitable one derived from the following
maximization problem: max
{
πR(zi), πO(zi), w˜(zi, τi)
}
.
• Proposition 1 There exists a threshold, denoted by τ¯ , such that individual i becomes a
farmer if τi ≥ τ¯ , and a worker otherwise. Conditional on being a farmer, the individual
is indifferent about which crop to produce, i.e. πR(zi) = πO(zi).
The proof of Proposition 1 comes from the indifference conditions between the choices of
occupation and production. Let us first consider the problem of choosing which crop to
produce by farmer i. From equations (4) and (5), it can be shown that the profit difference
across crop production choices for any farmer depends only on the output prices and rental
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rates of effective units of land. In particular,
πR(zi)− πO(zi) = zi
(p1/αR
qR
) α
1−α
−
(
p
1/α
O
qO
) α
1−α
 (7)
Here, farmer i will produce rice if πR(zi)− πO(zi) ≥ 0, and other crops otherwise. It is clear
that the production choice is independent of individual endowment {zi, τi}. If the inequality
pR/q
α
R
> pO/q
α
O
is satisfied, then all farmers would choose to produce rice. Conversely, if
pR/q
α
R
< pO/q
α
O
, all farmers would engage in the production of other crops. I then place a
plausible restriction on the utility function so that the indifference curve for consumption
goods does not cross the consumption axes (the assumed function is shown in Section 3.5).
This way, corner solutions will not be possible, and the case where pR/q
α
R
6= pO/q
α
O
cannot
constitute an equilibrium. Therefore, in an equilibrium where the equality pR/q
α
R
= pO/q
α
O
must be satisfied, farmer i is indifferent about which crop to produce πR(zi) = πO(zi) = π(zi).
This profit indifference condition also suggests a common price ratio λ ≡ qR/p
1/α
R = qO/p
1/α
O
across farms and crops.
Next, an individual i with a set {zi, τi} maximizes her earnings by choosing to be a non-
agricultural worker for an amount of w˜(zi, τi) or a farmer for a profit of π(zi). The optimal
occupational choice can be described by the indifference condition between earnings across
the two occupations. Equalizing w˜(zi, τi) and π(zi) yields the threshold τ¯ , such that,
(1− τ¯)pMλ
α
1−α = 1 (8)
Intuitively, the idiosyncratic distortion τi can be thought of as any type of barriers to labor
mobility across sectors. For example, the set of farmers i ∈ NA includes those who face a high
enough migration cost, i.e. τi ≥ τ¯ , so that they decide to stay in agriculture. Analogously,
the set of workers i ∈ NM are those enjoying lower cost of mobility, i.e. τi < τ¯ , thus moving
to the non-agricultural sector. Utilizing the common price ratio λ = qR/p
1/α
R = qO/p
1/α
O and
solutions to farm profit maximization as in equation (3), I can express the optimizing rules
for farmer i as follows,
π(zi) =
zi
λα/1−α
(9)
pRyR(zi) = pOyO(zi) =
zi
(1− α)λα/1−α
(10)
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qReR(zi) = qOeO(zi) =
αzi
(1− α)λα/1−α
(11)
These equations suggest that farm profit (9), value-added (10), and input expenditure (11) are
equal across crop choices for each farmer. With α and λ being common across farms, equation
(10) states that variation in farm value-added linearly depends on variation in individual
ability. This characterization provides a simple mapping between the model distribution of
farmer’s ability and the empirical distribution of farm’s value-added in the calibration.
3.4 Restrictions and Land Allocation
In this section, I turn to discuss land use allocation. As discussed in Section 3.1, agricultural
land comprises a set of parcels, such that the total agricultural area is the sum of all parcel
areas L =
∫
j∈J
ljdj. The variable δ is an indicator, with the convention that δj = 1 if parcel
j is subject to RLDP. Therefore, the total restricted area in agriculture can be expressed as∫
j∈J
δjljdj, and the total unrestricted land is given by
∫
j∈J
(1− δj)ljdj.
In the absence of land use restrictions, all farmers maximize their profits, implying that
parcels of land are optimally utilized. This means the land supplier (representative household)
rents out the parcels at their highest values, and the land renters (farmers) will put them to
their best use. Consider parcel j ∈ J with a suitability set {sR, sO}, the value of this parcel
is given by qRERj = qRljsRj if it is used in rice production. Similarly, if parcel j is utilized for
non-rice production, its value is qOEOj = qOljsOj . Then, the optimal value of parcel j follows
a rule given by,
V ∗j = max
{
qRljsRj, qOljsOj
}
= λlj max
{
p
1/α
R sRj, p
1/α
O sOj
}
, ∀j ∈ J (12)
where I make use of the equality λ = qR/p
1/α
R = qO/p
1/α
O (see Proposition 1) to derive the
right-hand side of equation (12). However, due to RLDP restrictions, the parcels with δ = 1
can only be used in rice production. Consequently, the values of these parcels are distorted.
For example, if parcel j ∈ J is reserved for rice production, i.e. δj = 1, then its value is
simply fixed at [qRljsRj]. Put it differently, there are no other choices regarding land use for
the parcels subject to RLDP.
Equation (12) states that the optimal use of a parcel is determined by the relative suitabilities
and crop prices. For example, if (sRj/sOj)
α > pO/pR, then it is efficient to devote parcel j for
rice production, and vice versa. Let D be a dummy variable indicating the optimal use of all
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parcels, with the convention that D = 1 if it is optimal for a parcel to produce rice. The
optimizing rule for land use in equation (12) can also be described by,
Dj ∈ argmax
{
Djp
1/α
R sRj + (1−Dj)p
1/α
O sOj
}
, ∀j ∈ J (13)
With this way of denotation, I can express the total land rent, which is aggregated from
equation (12), in a more compact form. Particularly, the total land rent in rice production,
denoted by QR, is given by,
QR = λp
1/α
R
(∫
ljsRjδj dj +
∫
ljsRj(1− δj)Dj dj
)
(14)
and in the production of other crops, denoted by QO, is as the following,
QO = λp
1/α
O
∫
ljsOj(1− δj)(1−Dj) dj (15)
In equation (14), the first and second integral terms are the total effective units of land used
in rice production for the restricted and unrestricted areas respectively. Analogously, the
value of the integral in equation (15) represents the total effective units of land utilized for
the production of other crops, conditional on not being restricted.
3.5 Consumption
The representative household uses all of its income to purchase consumption goods. The total
income can stem from three main sources: (i) individual income from workers and farmers
W =
∫
i∈NM
w˜(zi, τi)di+
∫
i∈NA
π(zi)di, (ii) a lump sum transfer T coming from idiosyncratic
distortions, and (iii) land income from renting out agricultural land for farm production
Q = QR +QO. The household seeks to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint
pRCR + pOCO + pMCM = W + T +Q. It has preferences over the consumption of agricultural
and non-agricultural goods described by the following utility function,
lnU = (1− β) lnCM + β ln
([
φC
ζ−1
ζ
R + (1− φ)C
ζ−1
ζ
O
] ζ
ζ−1
− ψ
)
(16)
where {CR, CO} denote the total consumption of each agricultural good, and CM is the
total consumption of the non-agricultural good. The parameters {φ, β} ∈ (0, 1) govern the
13
preference weights across consumption goods, and ζ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across
crops. Finally, the parameter ψ depicts the subsistence requirement for agricultural goods in
the spirit of Restuccia et al. (2008). Thus, the household always prioritizes the consumption
of agricultural goods up to ψ level. After that, it may allocate the remaining income to all
goods according to their weights. The first order conditions gives us the standard results,
pR
pO
(
CR
CO
)1/ζ
=
φ
1− φ
,
pMCM
pRCR + pOCO − χ(pR, pO)
=
1− β
β
(17)
where χ(pR, pO) = ψ
[
pR
(
φ
pR
)ζ
+ pO
(
1−φ
pO
)ζ]1/1−ζ
. Intuitively, the right hand equality of
equation (17) states that the household always devotes χ(pR, pO) amount of its income to
agricultural goods to survive. After meeting the subsistence requirement, it can freely allocate
the remaining income to non-agricultural goods pMCM and non-subsistent agricultural goods
pRCR + pOCO − χ(pR, pO), according to the preference weights.
4 Equilibrium and Misallocation
In this section, I first define a competitive equilibrium of the model where RLDP is prevalent.
Then, I describe the effects of the land use restrictions on both land and labor allocation. To
do so, I compare the current economy of Vietnam to a hypothetical economy where all areas
subject to RLDP are liberated.
4.1 Equilibrium
I consider the static competitive equilibrium of the model in the presence of RLDP, consisting
of: (i) an output price set {pR, pO, pM}, (ii) an input price set {w, qR, qO}, (iii) a set of farmer
decision functions
{
eg(z), yg(z)
}
g∈{R,O}
, (iv) a threshold characterizing occupational choices
τ¯ , (v) a set of indicators {Dj, δj} ∀j ∈ J describing land use and restriction status, and (vi)
a bundle of consumption choices {CR, CO, CM}, such that,
• Given prices, the threshold τ¯ is the optimal occupational choice for all individuals, and
Dj ∀j ∈ J is the optimal use for all unrestricted parcels.
• Given prices, the allocation rules
{
eg(z), yg(z)
}
g∈{R,O}
are profit-maximizing for all
individuals choosing to be farmers.
• Given prices, the bundle {CR, CO, CM} is utility-maximizing for the representative
household, subject to the budget constraints.
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• Representative non-agricultural firm optimizes, budget balances, and all markets clear,
1. Output markets from equation (6, 10) and budget balance,
pMCM + pRCR + pOCO = pM
∫
i∈NM
zidi+
λα/α−1
1− α
∫
i∈NA
zidi (18)
2. Land market from equation (11, 14, 15) and the household’s land income,
QR +QO =
αλα/α−1
1− α
∫
i∈NA
zidi (19)
4.2 Misallocation
The following discussion describes the effects of RLDP on productivity through two channels,
namely land use misallocation and distortions in occupational choice. To do so, the current
economy of Vietnam is compared to a hypothetical economy where all restrictions are removed.
To keep the discussion intuitive and straightforward, I provide examples in which I abstract
from the offsetting effects caused by changes in prices.
• Proposition 2 Removing RLDP raises the aggregate agricultural output and agricul-
tural TFP by increasing the average effective stock of agricultural land.
The intuition is quite simple. Removing restrictions means that the entire agricultural land
can be put to their best use. As a result, the effective stock of agricultural land is maximized,
leading to an increase in the agricultural total factor productivity. For quantitative reasoning,
I denote by YA = pRYR + pOYO the aggregate agricultural output (real agricultural GDP),
and by TFPA the agricultural total factor productivity. Then, I formalize an equation that
allows me to quantify the value of TFPA. First, from equation (10), the total agricultural
output YA can be derived as follows,
YA =
λα/α−1
1− α
∫
i∈NA
zidi = z¯ANA
λα/α−1
1− α
(20)
where z¯A is the average farmer ability, and z¯ANA is the total stock of farmer ability. Analo-
gously, I denote by E¯ = (QR +QO)
/
λL the average effective stock of land (please refer to
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equations (14) and (15) for full expressions). Then, the land market’s clearing condition from
equation (19) can be rewritten as the following,
λ
1
α−1 =
E¯L
z¯ANA
1− α
α
(21)
Combining equations (20) and (21), the aggregate agricultural output can be expressed as a
function of total agricultural land (L), the total number of farmers (NA), and agricultural
TFP, given by,
YA =
[(
E¯
α
)α(
z¯A
1− α
)1−α]
LαN1−αA
≡
[
TFPA
]
LαN1−αA
(22)
where the term TFPA representing the agricultural TFP will be my primary focus when
performing the quantitative analysis. In addition, the functional form of TFPA states that
any improvement in the average effective stock of land (E¯) or farmer ability (z¯A) will raise
the agricultural TFP.
For the purpose of simplicity, let us consider a simple case where all prices and labor allocation
are held fixed. I denote by E¯∗ the average effective stock of land at the efficient level. From
the discussion in Section 3.4, the total gain in the average effective stock of land stemming
from RLDP relaxation is given by,
E¯∗ − E¯ =
1
L
∫
ljδj
[
max
{
p
1/α
R sRj, p
1/α
O sOj
}
− p
1/α
R sRj
]
dj
=
1
L
∫
ljδj(1−Dj)
(
p
1/α
O sOj − p
1/α
R sRj
)
dj
(23)
Here, the effective units of land are weighted by the corresponding constant prices. The
dummy δ indicates the restriction status of the parcels of agricultural land. Similar to
equation (12), the maximization term here regulates the optimal land use for all of the parcels
(∀j ∈ J). First, equation (23) states that not all restricted areas are distorted in land use. For
example, if parcel j’s optimal choice is to produce rice, i.e. max
{
p
1/α
R sRj, p
1/α
O sOj
}
= p
1/α
R sRj ,
then RLDP does not change its optimal use. Thus, there is no gain in the effective stock of
land as the term in the square bracket of equation (23) takes a value of zero. However, if the
optimal choice of parcel j is to produce other crops, i.e. max
{
p
1/α
R sRj, p
1/α
O sOj
}
= p
1/α
O sOj,
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then RLDP prevents the parcel from being optimally utilized. It is clear that the loss in the
effective stock of land is captured by the difference term lj
[
p
1/α
O sOj − p
1/α
R sRj
]
. Therefore, in
this simple case, the gains in the agricultural TFP and aggregate output from eliminating
RLDP is induced by an increase in the average effective stock of land, given by,
Y ∗A
YA
=
TFP ∗A
TFPA
=
(
E¯∗
E¯
)α
(24)
The equation also suggests that the gain in productivity is sensitive to the parameter value
α. To avoid overestimating the productivity gain, I take a conservative approach by choosing
a low value of α in calibration. Note that there are price effects offsetting the gain from
resource reallocation. The reason is that inputs (labor and land) and output (rice and others)
are not perfect substitutes. These price effects manifest themselves through both crop choice
and occupational choice. In the example given above, I abstract from the price effects for the
sake of simplicity. However, I do allow prices to change in my actual analysis.
In the next stage, I turn to discuss the changes that occur to occupational choices. As
the agricultural sector becomes more productive due to RLDP relaxation, there will be a
reallocation of labor across sectors. This movement has non-negligible impacts on both
agricultural and non-agricultural productivity.
• Proposition 3 Relaxing RLDP releases farmers from agriculture, thus raising the
total output in the non-agricultural sector.
The intuition is as follows. First, the supply of effective stocks of land is distorted by RDLP.
Consequently, the agricultural TFP and the total agricultural output in the restricted economy
are both lower than those at the efficient level. Since the representative household must
secure the subsistence consumption, it has to allocate a significant share of its members into
agriculture to compensate for the loss in the total agricultural output stemming from land
use misallocation.13 From Proposition 2, liberating RLDP will raise the agricultural output
by improvement in TFPA, thus reducing the burden of subsistence consumption requirement.
It follows that a number of farmers will be released to the non-agricultural sector as RLDP
restrictions being lifted.
13 Please refer to Restuccia et al. (2008) for a discussion on this topic. The authors also provide a simple
but intuitive setting in which misallocation in agriculture can lower the share of non-agricultural labor to
satisfy subsistence consumption.
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To facilitate the discussion, let us relax the assumption of fixed labor allocation in the
example given in Proposition 2. The output and input prices are still being held constant,
i.e. abstracting from the offsetting price effects. I proceed to write the right-hand equality
of equation (17) as βYM = (1− β)
[
YA − χ
]
. Then, the non-agricultural output gain can be
expressed as follows,
Y ∗M
YM
=
Y ∗A − χ
YA − χ
= 1 +
Y ∗A − YA
YA − χ
(25)
where Y ∗M is the non-agricultural output at the efficient level. Equation (25) states two
important points. First, as the total agricultural output increases (Y ∗A > YA), the total
non-agricultural output must also increase (Y ∗M > YM). Second, the higher the level of
subsistence consumption requirement, the larger the effect of misallocation. In other words,
the term [YA− χ] < YA captures the amplified output gain/loss in the non-agricultural sector
caused by misallocation in the agricultural sector. For example, the smaller the value of
YA − χ, the higher the value of (Y
∗
A − YA)/(YA − χ).
From equation (6), i.e. YM =
∫
i∈NM
zidi, it is clear that Y
∗
M > YM is driven by additional
workers moving to the non-agricultural sector, not the other way around. Therefore, my model
suggests that the gain/loss in agricultural productivity also reflects the increase/decrease in
the supply of workers in the non-agricultural sector.
Next, I denote by NS and z¯S the total number and the average ability of those switching
occupation after moving to the efficient level. As the assumption of fixed labor allocation is
relaxed, the gain in agricultural output derived from equation (22) is given by,
Y ∗A
YA
=
TFP ∗A
TFPA
(
NA −NS
NA
)1−α
=
(
E¯∗
E¯
)α(
NAz¯A −NS z¯S
NAz¯A
)1−α
(26)
where the term (NAz¯A−NS z¯S)/(NA−NS) is the average farmer ability, and the term NA−NS
is the total number of farmers at the efficient level. The equation suggests that the gain in
agricultural output is a geometric weighted mean of a change in the effective stock of land
and a change in farmer ability stock. Next, the non-agricultural output gain can be expressed
as the following,
Y ∗M
YM
=
NM z¯M +NS z¯S
NM z¯M
(27)
Here, NM and z¯M are the total number and the average ability of the existing workers. The
derivation is quite simple. The term NM z¯M =
∫
i∈NM
zidi is the current level of the non-
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agricultural output, and the term NM z¯M +NS z¯S =
∫
i∈NM,S
zidi expresses the non-agricultural
output at the efficient level. Dividing the later by former yields the equality (27). This
equation states that the gain in non-agricultural output is affected by a change in the stock
of worker ability.
• Proposition 4 Removing RLDP raises both the average farm size and the agricultural
TFP. However, it reduces the average ability of both farmers and workers through the
reallocation of labor across sectors. Such reductions offset the gain in agricultural TFP
and decrease non-agricultural labor productivity.
I continue with the example in Proposition 3. Since liberating RLDP leads to a decrease in
the number of farmers, it trivially induces an increase in the average farm size. From the
second equality of equation (26), I decompose the gain in agricultural TFP as follows,
TFP ∗A
TFPA
=
(
E¯∗
E¯
)α(
1 +
NS(z¯A − z¯S)
NAz¯A −NS z¯A
)1−α
(28)
This equation states that the change in agricultural TFP is driven by changes in both labor
and land allocations. As discussed in Proposition 2, lifting RLDP leads to an increase
in the average effective stock of land, thus contributing to the gain in agricultural TFP.
This gain can be reduced or amplified depending on the relationship between z¯A and z¯S.
For example, if z¯A < z¯S, the reallocation of labor out of agriculture will offset the gain in
agricultural TFP coming from land reallocation. Analogously, from equation (27), the change
in non-agricultural labor productivity is given by,
Y ∗M
NM +NS
NM
YM
=
NM z¯M +NS z¯S
NM z¯M +NS z¯M
= 1 +
NS(z¯S − z¯M)
NM z¯M +NS z¯M
(29)
Here, labor productivity in non-agriculture is obtained by dividing output by the total
number of workers. Since the representative firm requires only effective labor to produce,
non-agricultural labor productivity is also non-agricultural TFP. From equation (29), it is
clear that the change in non-agricultural labor productivity is also influenced by the average
ability of those moving out of agriculture. For example, if z¯S < z¯M , non-agricultural labor
productivity will decrease, and vice versa.
With reasonable parameter values in line with the calibration (labor productivity in non-
agriculture is much higher than in agriculture), the mobility cost τ is negatively correlated
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with individual ability z. I denote by τ¯ ∗ an efficient threshold characterizing occupational
choice. From the discussion of equation (8), it follows that individuals with τi ≥ τ¯
∗ will remain
in agriculture. Since liberating RLDP will reduce the number of farmers, the inequality
τ¯ ∗ > τ¯ must be satisfied. Therefore, the average ability of those moving out of agriculture
(those endowed with τ¯ ∗ > τi > τ¯ ) will be lower than the average ability of the existing workers,
but higher than that of the remaining farmers, i.e. z¯A < z¯S < z¯M . This movement implies
a reduction in the average ability of both farmers and workers. As a result, equation (28)
suggests that the reduction in average farmer ability will offset the gain in agricultural TFP
stemming from the improvement of effective stock of land. From equation (29), the average
ability of the new workers is relatively lower than the existing ones, which unambiguously
translates to lower labor productivity in the non-agricultural sector at the efficient level.
This implication coincides with the contribution of Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) in
which the reassignment of individuals between sectors can dampen the gain in TFP after
moving to the efficient level.
5 Connecting Model and Data
My strategy is to calibrate the model parameters in a benchmark economy to the restricted
economy where RLDP is prevalent. I proceed in two steps. In Section 5.1, I describe
the assumed functional form of individual characteristics H(z, τ) and the non-parametric
calibration of land characteristics. In Section 5.2, given the distributions of land and individual
characteristics, I calibrate the model parameters such that the model in an equilibrium matches
relevant data targets.
5.1 Individual and Land Characteristics
Individual Characteristics - I first take the log of both sides of the equation (10) to undo
the multiplication as follows,
log [py(zi)] = log zi −
[
log(1− α) +
α
1− α
log λ
]
(30)
where the term py(zi) = pRyR(zi) = pOyO(zi) is farmer i’s value-added regardless of crop choice.
With α and λ being common across all farms, equation (30) implies that variation in farm value-
added linearly depends on variation in individual ability, i.e. Var {log [py(zi)]} = Var {log z}.
This characterization provides a simple mapping between the model distribution of farmer’s
ability and the micro-data distribution of farm’s value-added in the calibration. In particular,
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I need the joint cdf H(z, τ) to closely reproduce farm value-added distribution and labor
productivity difference across the two sectors. Instead of directly parameterizing H(z, τ), I
follow an approach of Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014) in parameterizing the conditional
distribution H(z|τ). To do so, I first assume that the idiosyncratic distortions τ is drawn
from a uniform distribution in the range of [0, 1].14 Then, the ability distribution is assumed
to be conditionally log-normal taking the form of,
log zi = γ0 + γ1 log τi + ǫi (31)
where ǫi is a random variable drawn from a normal distribution with a variance of σ
2
ǫ . The
parameter γ0 serves as a scale. The two parameters γ1 and σǫ together govern the distribution
of ability. In particular, the parameter σǫ is used to reproduce the empirical variation of
farm value-added. The value of γ1 regulates the correlation between ability and distortions,
allowing me to reproduce the sectoral difference in labor productivity. A negative value
of γ1 implies a negative correlation between ability z and distortion τ . Consequently, low
ability individuals tend to face high mobility barrier, creating an incentive for them to stay
in agriculture. This characterization allows me to precisely match the large gap in labor
productivity across the two sectors. In Appendix D, I provide a more detailed discussion of
the relationship between γ1 and τ .
Land Characteristics - I do not rely on parametric assumptions about the distribution of
land characteristics. Instead, I exploit the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) to derive
the spatial distribution of crop-specific productivity and the Local Land Use Atlas 2011
(LLUA) to obtain the spatial distribution of the restricted areas.
I construct the spatial distribution of Vietnam’s agricultural land from LLUA provided by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. LLUA database comprises 63 high-resolution
maps corresponding to 63 provinces. These maps are prepared by the district land offices
throughout the country and reported to the General Department of Land Administration.15
I then digitize the maps using ArcGIS.16 On the maps, RLDP and non-RLDP areas are
14 In computation, I also trim 0.1% tails of the distribution for consistency.
15 It is worth noting that the National Assembly 2011 established RLDP restriction quotas for each province
in the next ten years based on the detail information of LLUA.
16 The process of transformation is done by requiring the coordinate grids of the maps and the shapefile to
exactly match.
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color differentiated, allowing me to separate them computationally. As a result, I obtain full
information on which area is for agriculture production (both RLDP and non-RLDP areas)
and which agricultural area is subject to RLDP.
The constructed shapefile is graphically presented in Figure 1. The spatial distribution of
Vietnam’s agricultural land is displayed in Figure 1a. Then, I divide agricultural land into
yellow and blue areas, as shown in Figure 1b. Farmlands that fall in the yellow region is
reserved for rice production only. The remaining located in the blue region is where farmers
can cultivate other types of crops. As reported in Resolution 29/2004/QH11, the share of the
restricted area is around 45%, which is close to the value of 46% in my constructed dataset.
Hence, the digitized atlas and the actual estimate are quite similar.
Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Agricultural Land
(a) Agricultural Land (b) RLDP vs. Non-RLDP
Notes: The figures above show the constructed shapefile. The left figure displays the spatial distribution
of Vietnam’s agricultural land. The right figure divides agricultural land into two types: (i) farmlands
that fall in the yellow region is reserved for rice production only, and (ii) the remaining located in the
blue region is where farmers can cultivate other types of crops.
Next, I employ the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database, which provides the
potential yields (in tons/ha/year) for different crops across micro-geographical units. A
number of earlier studies, such as Costinot and Donaldson (2016) and Adamopoulos and
Restuccia (2018), have used GAEZ to estimate agricultural productivity by crop. The potential
yields here depend on purely exogenous agro-climatic conditions. Each unit (cell) is about 10
km2 (5 arc-minute to be specific). Moreover, the potential yields are reported for different
alternatives depending on water sources (irrigated and rain-fed) and agricultural practices
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(high, low, and intermediate inputs intensity).17 I choose the potential yields associated with
irrigated water sources and intermediate input intensity, which closely describe agricultural
practices in Vietnam.
From the GAEZ database, I acquire potential yields for wetland rice and other 17 major crops
for each cell.18 Combining with the spatial distribution of agricultural land (see Figure 1), I
obtain full information on potential yields across 18 crops on the agricultural land of Vietnam.
I further report the spatial distributions of the potential yields across parcels of agricultural
land in Figure A1 in the Appendix. For illustrative purposes, the yields on agricultural land
in Figure A1 are divided into 4 quantiles, ranging from light-green to dark-green.
Figure 2: Intersecting Grid Cells with Agricultural Land
(a) Cells & Agricultural Land (b) Parcels from Intersection
Notes: The figures above show how GAEZ’s grid cells are intersected by LLUA’s polygons. The yellow
and blue polygons represent restricted and unrestricted land respectively. The gray fishnet in the
left figure is the GAEZ’s grid cells carrying potential yields. In the right figure, the gray fishnet is
intersected by LLUA’s polygons to form smaller polygons referred to as parcels. Here, the white area is
non-agricultural land that is not relevant to the analysis.
In the combined dataset, the smallest spatial unit is a GAEZ’s grid cell intersecting (overlap-
ping) with an LLUA’s polygon, corresponding to a parcel in the model.19 Figure 2 shows
how the process of intersection is done. In Figure 2a, the yellow and blue polygons represent
restricted and unrestricted land respectively. The gray fishnet is the GAEZ’s grid cells
17 Low inputs represent labor-intensive practice without the use of fertilizer, pesticides, and chemicals (FPC for
short). Intermediate inputs represent medium labor intensity practice with hand tools, some mechanization,
and some FPC. High inputs represent low labor intensity with full mechanization, full utilization of FPC,
and other advanced techniques. See www.gaez.fao.org and Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2018) for details.
18 Since dryland rice comprises a very small fraction of the total rice area, I focus on the wetland rice here.
19 See http://desktop.arcgis.com/en/arcmap/10.3/tools/analysis-toolbox/intersect.htm for details.
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carrying potential yields of the 18 crops. As shown in Figure 2b, the fishnet is intersected
with the polygons to form smaller polygons referred to as parcels. Note that the white area is
non-agricultural land that is not relevant to the analysis. Farmland of the same parcel carries
the same land characteristics, including productivities and restrictions. For each parcel, I
have information on parcel size (l), restriction status (δ), and potential yields of 18 crops.
Next, I employ six waves of Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS) conducted
in even years from 2004 to 2014 to obtain a farm-gate price for each crop. For each crop-by-
farm, a unit value is computed by dividing output value by the physical quantity. A common
set of prices is thus constructed as sample-wide averages for each crop. Then, I calculate
the potential (maximum) revenue generated on each parcel for each crop using these prices
([potential yields]×[parcel size]×[crop price]). A measure of potential revenue for the non-rice
crop is computed by taking the simple average of the potential revenues of the other 17 crops.
As a result, I obtain the potential revenue for rice (p̂RyRj) and non-rice (p̂OyOj) for all parcels.
Unlike the actual yields that rely on the skills of the farmers, the potential yields are not
constrained by farmers’ ability. In other words, farmers’ ability is assumed to be high enough
so that they can achieve the potential yields on their land. GAEZ considers this level of
ability to be common, so that crop yields are defined consistently across all cells and crops. I
refer to this level of ability as potential ability, denoted by zp. Then, the potential revenues
of parcel j ∈ J for growing rice or non-rice can be expressed as the following,
p̂RyRj = pRκz
1−α
p [ljsRi]
α , p̂OyOj = pOκz
1−α
p [ljsOi]
α (32)
These equalities imply that the relative potential revenues between any two parcels {j, k} for
each crop is governed only by crop-specific productivities and parcel sizes. In particular,
p̂RyRj
p̂RyRk
=
(
ljsRj
lksRk
)α
,
p̂OyOj
p̂RyOk
=
(
ljsOj
lksOk
)α
(33)
This characterization allows a simple mapping between productivities and potential revenues.
I proceed to normalize sR,max = sO,max = 1. Simply put, I let the highest values of sR and
sO to serve as the denominators in the equalities above. Note that what matters in the
model is the dispersion and correlation between the two-dimensional productivity {sR, sO},
the mean levels will be scaled as the relative prices pR/pO is solved within the model. Thus,
such normalization does not affect the results in my analysis. Then, with the values of parcel
24
areas (lj), potential revenues (p̂RyRj and p̂OyOj), and parameter α, I can back out the values
of crop-specific productivities {sRj, sOj} ∀j ∈ J . Combining with the spatial distributions
of restrictions, I complete the spatial distribution of land characteristics without relying on
parametric assumptions. The cumulative distributions of land characteristics are illustrated
in Figure A2. The first two sub-figures are the cumulative distributions of rice and non-rice
productivities respectively. I further consider the distributions of land productivities on the
restricted and unrestricted areas separately in the last four sub-figures.
While spatial information is at the parcel-level, it is not necessary that farmers would need
to rent the whole parcel for production. The model allows for many farms located within
a parcel or many parcels located within a farm. What matters to farmers is the effective
unit of land (size×crop-specific productivities). For a given ability, a farmer can either have
a large farm with low land quality or a small farm with high land quality. Her total land
rental cost and value-added are the same regardless of the option she chooses. By doing
so, the model is flexible in allowing for different combinations of farms’ sizes and shapes, as
long as the total agricultural area is fixed and land characteristics follow GAEZ and LLUA’s
empirical distributions. However, in exchange for such flexibility, the model must rely on the
assumption that there is no spatial connection between farmer and land characteristics. In
other words, the model assumes that the distributions of individual and land characteristics
are independent. This assumption is quite plausible because the study makes use of GAEZ’s
potential yields, which depend on purely exogenous agro-climatic conditions.
5.2 Calibration Choices
I am now ready to discuss my calibration choices. The restricted economy is characterized
by 10 model parameters. I take two of them from previous literature and normalize one
parameter to unity {α, ζ, pR}. The other seven parameters need to be calibrated within the
model {γ0, γ1, σǫ, L/N, φ, β, ψ/N}.
Price, Technology, Substitutability {pR, α, ζ} - Since what matters in the model is the
relative price, I start by normalizing pR to one. Then, the technology parameter α regulating
the income share of land is set at 0.33. This choice of value is in a reasonable range of
previous studies on developing economies. With a similar production function, Gottlieb and
Grobovsek (2019) also target land income share, resulting in a value of α = 1/3. Besides,
Haley (1991) reports a land share of 0.34 for Asian countries, Restuccia and Santaeulalia-
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Llopis (2017) document a share of 0.39 for Malawi, and Adamopoulos et al. (2017) estimate
a land income share of 0.36 for China. My choice of value is slightly below the average so as
to be conservative in estimating the effects of land misallocation. The parameter ζ, which
regulates the substitutability across agricultural goods, is set to 2.63. This choice reflects the
midpoint between a value of 2.44 to 2.80 in Sotelo (2015) and a value of 2.82 in Costinot et
al. (2016).
Table 1: Parameterization - Targets and Results
Parameter Value Target
pR 1 Normalization
α 0.33 Land to labor income share
ζ 2.63 Elasticity of substitution
γ0 7.74 Average farm value-added ($668)
γ1 -0.63 Sectoral relative labor productivity (4.21)
σǫ 1.31 Farm value-added dispersion (1.30)
L/N 0.58 Average farm size (1.16 ha)
φ 0.24 Share of rice land in agriculture (53.85%)
β 0.11 Subsistence income (144$)
ψ/N 39.30 Current agricultural employment (49.75%)
Labor Characteristics {γ0, γ1, σǫ, L/N} - According to the characterization of equation
(30), the model distribution of ability should be able to reproduce the distribution of farm’s
value-added (in logs). To do so, I utilize the Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys
(VHLSS) dataset, which is an unbalanced panel survey of six waves over the period of 2004 -
2014. The sample of this dataset reflects the samples of the population census. Therefore,
this dataset is likely to be nationally representative and comparable with the aggregate
statistics. I proceed to exclude households not involved in agriculture production. Then,
farm value-added is computed by subtracting the costs of intermediate inputs from the total
values of output produced.20 I also trim 1% tails to rule out potential measurement errors.
This procedure results in a dispersion of log value-added of 1.30.
Another important statistic is the labor productivity ratio between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. From the World Bank collection of development indicators 2004 - 2014,
I obtain an average employment share in agriculture of 49.75% and an average agricultural
value-added share of 19.01%. These statistics translate to a relative labor productivity ratio
20 The costs of intermediate inputs include seeds, saplings, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, non-durable tools,
energy, fuel, maintenance, irrigation fees, transportation, and other minor costs.
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between the two sectors of approximately 4.21.21
I proceed to set the parameter γ0 at 7.74, such that the average farm value-added is 668 US
dollars as estimated by World Bank (2000 constant price). Given the value of γ0, I then
estimate the other two parameters {γ1, σǫ}. Particularly, I want the model to generate a
relative labor productivity ratio between the two sectors of 4.21 in the equilibrium. This
target implies a value of γ1 = −0.63. Next, I use σǫ to reproduce the dispersion of the
log value-added of 1.30. This requires a parameter value of σǫ = 1.31. For the aggregate
endowment of labor and land, I set the ratio of L/N to 0.58 implying an average farm size of
1.16 hectares as observed in VHLSS over the period of 2004 - 2014.
Preferences and Endowment {φ, β, ψ/N} - I target the share of land dedicated to rice
production in calibrating the preference for rice φ. Given the distributions of individual and
land characteristics, I set φ = 0.24 such that the model yields the share of total rice land in
agriculture of 53.85%, as reported by the General Statistics Office over the period of 2004 -
2014. I then set β = 0.11 and ψ/N = 39.30 such that: (i) the cost of subsistence consumption
(χ/N) is $144 as announced by the Vietnamese government, and (ii) the current share of
agriculture employment of 49.75%. Prior studies, e.g. Gollin et al. (2002, 2007), Restuccia et
al. (2008), and Gottlieb and Grobovsek (2019), suggest a smaller value of β. According to a
robustness check in Section 6.2, moving the value of β closer to zero would imply slightly
stronger misallocation effects.
Table 1 summarizes the values of all 10 model parameters. Recall that the first three
parameters {pR, α, ζ} are either normalized or assigned directly based on previous literature.
The remaining 7 parameters are determined by requiring the model to exactly reproduce
relevant data targets. I refer to this calibrated economy as the benchmark economy. Figures
3a and 3b show my approximated distribution of farm value-added (dashed blue line) and the
cumulative distribution across value-added observations (solid red line) in the data. Overall,
the calibrated model matches reasonably well the observed farm value-added from the micro
dataset, given the choices of the model parameters.
21 Agricultural labor productivity is 0.1901
0.4975
× GDP
Labor
. Non-agricultural labor productivity is 0.8099
0.5025
× GDP
Labor
. I
then divide the later by the former to obtain a labor productivity ratio of 4.21.
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Figure 3: Calibrated Model versus Data at Farm Level
(a) Cumulative Distribution of Farms (b) Cumulative Distribution of Agri. GDP
Notes: The figures above compare the approximated distribution of farm value-added (dashed blue line)
with the actual value-added distribution obtained from the micro-level data (solid red line). The left and
right figures show the cumulative distribution of farms and agricultural GDP respectively.
6 Quantitative Analysis
From the benchmark economy, I conduct a set of counterfactual experiments to quantify
the influence of RLDP on the allocation of resources. First, I investigate the impacts of
solely removing restricted land, with an emphasis on resource allocation and key aggregate
statistics. Second, I explore several policy options that Vietnam could employ to achieve the
same targets as in the RLDP-restricted economy. Finally, I perform sensitivity checks for
several parameter values.
6.1 Full Relaxation and Main Results
The baseline experiment concerns the effects of entirely liberating RLDP. To do so, I set
δj = 0 ∀j ∈ J , then re-solve the model with the calibrated set of parameters. I first pay
particular attention to the impact that RLDP generates on land and labor allocation. Then,
I focus on a number of key aggregate observations such as labor productivity, real output,
and GDP per capita.
Land and Labor Allocation - The first channel, which is discussed in Proposition 2, is
land use reallocation. Fully removing RLDP means that the entire agricultural land can be
put to their best use. Figure 4a illustrates the spatial allocation of land use in the restricted
economy. The green area where rice is being grown covers approximately 54% of agricultural
land, 46% and 8% of which are RLDP-restricted and unrestricted respectively. Non-rice crops
are cultivated on the remaining land (purple area) consisting of around 46% of agricultural
28
land. In addition, 11.55% of the land is utilized for rice production voluntarily. This means
8.3% of RLDP land (3.55% of total land) is not binding, and farmers still choose to produce
rice in the absence of RLDP on this area (see the discussion of equation (23)).
Figure 4: Crop Allocation: Restricted vs. Unrestricted
(a) Land Use with RLDP (b) Land Use without RLDP
Notes: The left figure illustrates the spatial allocation of land use in the restricted economy, and the
right figure shows the hypothetical situation after removing RLDP. Rice and non-rice are produced in
the green and purple areas respectively.
The spatial reallocation of land use in the efficient economy is presented in Figure 4b. The
figure states two important points. First, under full relaxation, agricultural land is optimally
utilized, with 16% of the land being reallocated to the production of the other crops. As a
result, the rice area reduces to 38% while the non-rice area increases to 62% of agricultural
land. Second, in the central and southern part, most of the rice land in the restricted economy
is converted to non-rice land after RLDP being lifted. In contrast, fewer non-rice and more
rice crops are grown in the northeastern part at the efficient level. In total, 33% of agricultural
land is converted from rice to non-rice production, and 17% of agricultural land is turned
from non-rice into rice cultivation. The reason is that the non-rice price (with respect to
rice price) decreases from 2.69 to 1.84. Thus, it becomes more profitable to convert from
non-rice to rice production in some areas (mostly in the northeastern region) since the relative
suitability between non-rice and rice is not high enough (see equation (13) for the optimizing
rule of crop choice). Relevant statistics of land allocation are provided in Table 2A.
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Next, I focus on the impacts of liberating RLDP on individual choices of occupation. Figure
5a depicts cumulative agricultural employment as a function of individual ability (log). Here,
the restricted economy (solid red line) induces a larger share of agricultural employment
compared to the unrestricted economy (dashed blue line). The reason is that the agricultural
productivity in the restricted economy is lower than that of the efficient level. Consequently,
a larger share of labor must be devoted to agriculture to ensure enough agricultural output
for subsistence consumption.
Figure 5: Labor Allocation: Restricted vs. Unrestricted
(a) Agricultural Employment (b) Non-agricultural Employment
Notes: The left figure compares the cumulative agricultural employment share in the restricted economy
(solid red line) to the one in the unrestricted economy (dashed blue line). The right figure shows gradual
declines in farmer average ability (solid red line) and worker average ability (dashed blue line) as the
process of labor reallocation occurs.
The movement of labor out of agriculture as RLDP being lifted has two important implications
for labor productivity. First, a reduction in the total number of farmers raises the ratio of
land to farmer. In particular, approximately 3% of the working population moves to the
non-agricultural sector as RLDP is liberated. Since the total agricultural area is fixed, this
switch leads to an increase in the average farm size of 6.26% accordingly. Second, the average
ability of those moving out of agriculture is lower than the average ability of the existing
workers but higher than that of the remaining farmers (see Proposition 4). This movement
induces a reduction in the average farmer and worker ability by 1.46% and 3.34% respectively.
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For illustration, Figure 5b shows the relationship between the labor movement and sectoral
average ability. Here, job switching rate refers to the share of the working population moving
from agricultural to non-agricultural sector. The average ability ratio is the ratio of sectoral
averages to their benchmark values. The figure shows gradual declines in farmer average
ability (solid red line) and worker average ability (dashed blue line) as the process of labor
reallocation occurs. Table 2B summarizes the relevant statistics of the labor allocation
discussed above. In addition, I model farmers to be indifferent in crop choice leading to
indeterminacy in labor allocation of rice and non-rice activity. What matters is the share
of the total stock of farmer ability (
∫
i∈NA
zidi) devoted to each crop production, which is
regulated by the distribution of land characteristics. Therefore, I only report results for labor
allocation between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.
Table 2: The Effects of Removing RLDP on Factor Allocation
Restricted Efficient Change (%) Others
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(A) Land Allocation
1. Share of rice land 0.539 0.377 -29.97% -
2. Share of non-rice land 0.461 0.623 +34.97% -
3. Non-binding RLDP land share - - - 0.083
4. Rice to non-rice land share - - - 0.331
5. Non-rice to rice land share - - - 0.170
(B) Labor Allocation
1. Share of farmers 0.497 0.468 -5.89% -
2. Share of workers 0.503 0.532 +5.83% -
3. Average farm size 1.16 1.23 +6.26% -
4. Average farmer ability 6,499 6,404 -1.46% -
5. Average worker ability 20,305 19,627 -3.34% -
(C) Relative Prices
1. Non-rice crops to Rice 2.688 1.835 -31.73% -
2. Non-agriculture goods to Rice 0.138 0.149 +7.39% -
Aggregate Statistics - Next, I compare important aggregate statistics between the restricted
and unrestricted economy. The results are summarized in Table 3. It is important to note
that all outputs in Table 3 are defined in terms of real GDP. All of the values are in constant
2000 US dollars, i.e. evaluated at the benchmark prices. The nominal GDP can be computed
using the new set of prices, which can be important in welfare analysis. However, the focus
of the paper is misallocation and productivity. Therefore, the nominal GDP is not relevant.
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In the first row of Panel A in Table 3, I report the agricultural total factor productivity TFPA.
I find that eliminating RLDP raises agricultural TFP by 37.89%. As discussed previously,
the two channels of resource reallocation leading to the gain in productivity are land and
labor allocation. Land allocation alone contributes to the gain in TFP by 1.4-fold. This
gain, however, is offset by a factor of 0.98 from the reduction of the average farmer ability
(see equation (22)). Another important concern is farmer average productivity YA/NA. As
shown in the second row of Panel A, farmer productivity experiences an increase of 40.68%
from $668 per farmer to $939 per farmer. To understand this gain, I decompose farmer
productivity into the following based on equation (22),
YA
NA
= TFPA
(
L
NA
)α
(34)
From this decomposition, the increase of 40.68% in farmer productivity is due to the increases
in agricultural TFP and average farm size by 37.89% and 6.26% respectively. Here, the
change in average farm size is due to the reallocation of around 3% working population from
agriculture to non-agriculture, raising the ratio of land to farmer. The gains in agricultural
TFP and farm size together constitute the total gain in average farmer productivity through
a multiplicative effect.22
Table 3: The Effects of Removing RLDP on Aggregate Outcomes
Restricted Efficient Change (%)
(1) (2) (3)
(A) Productivity
1. Agricultural productivity TFPA 636 877 +37.89%
2. Farmer productivity YA/NA 668 939 +40.68%
3. Non-Ag. worker productivity pMYM/NM 2,812 2,718 -3.34%
4. GDP per capita (YA + pMYM )/N 1,745 1,885 +8.03%
(B) Real Output per Capita
1. Rice 64.36 35.58 -44.71%
2. Other crops 99.63 150.36 +50.92%
3. Non-agricultural good 10,203 10,438 +2.30%
Notes: In Panel A, I denote by YA = pRYR + pOYO the agricultural GDP. All prices are evaluated at the
benchmark level in calculating productivity gain, i.e. valued at constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
Reported in the third row of Panel A, labor productivity in the non-agricultural sector
22 For a graphical comparison between the restricted and unrestricted economy, please refer to Figure A3 in
Appendix A where the cumulative and density distributions of farm value-added are plotted.
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decreases by 3.34%. From the discussion of Proposition 4, the reason is that the average
ability of those moving out of agriculture is lower than the average ability of the existing
workers. These individuals increase the number of workers by 5.83% while driving down the
average ability by 3.34%, thus reducing the non-agricultural labor productivity by an equal
amount. Economy-wide labor productivity is also of interest. As shown in the last row of
Panel A, I find that eliminating RLDP raises economy-wide labor productivity by 8.03%.
This improvement results from the increase in agricultural labor productivity combined with
the offsetting effect from the reduction of non-agricultural labor productivity.
It is also of interest to look at the real outputs. Lifting RLDP reduces the total amount of
rice dramatically by 44.71% while increasing the output of other crops and non-agricultural
goods by 50.92% and 2.30% respectively. I cautiously note that the gain in productivity
costs a non-negligible loss in the total rice output. Since the novelty of RLDP is to ensure
national food sources, it is important to assess the matter of self-sufficiency in rice production.
According to the FAOSTAT database, total rice consumption is 0.44 the total amount
produced as of 2013. In the analysis, the level of rice produced at the efficient level is 0.55 the
benchmark amount (35.58/64.36), which is still well above the current level of consumption
of 0.44. Moreover, there is a declining trend in rice consumption over the year because of
the increases in per capita income. For example, using household-level surveys, World Bank
(2016) estimates that household rice expenditure decreased by more than 30% from 2002 to
2012. Therefore, these observations together call for the need for removing RLDP.
Overall, my baseline results suggest that eliminating RLDP leads to an 8.03% increase
in real GDP per capita. This improvement is indicated by a 40.68% gain in agricultural
labor productivity, a rise of 37.89% in agricultural TFP, a 5.89% reduction in agricultural
employment, and a 6.26% increase in average farm size. An important question to ask is
whether these values together make sense. In a model calibrated to the U.S, Adamopoulos
and Restuccia (2014b) document that reducing economy-wide productivity to the poor
economy-level increases the share of agricultural employment from 2.5% to 16.6%, decreases
average farm size by 8.6-fold, depresses agricultural labor productivity by 11.2-fold, and
generates a 7.6-fold reduction in aggregate labor productivity. Compared to their results,
mine are much smaller in magnitude because I focus exclusively on a particular case of
resource misallocation. However, the pattern is the same regarding the channels through
which agricultural misallocation manifests itself.
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6.2 Policy Options
The next experiment explores several policy options that Vietnam could employ to achieve the
same targets as in the restricted economy. To do so, I classify policy options into three types,
including: (i) price support to artificially increase the price of rice, (ii) relative suitability
(sR/sO) designation to reserve parcels of land for rice production based on their rice to non-rice
suitability ratios, and (iii) rice suitability (sR) designation to assign rice land restrictions on
parcels based on rice suitability alone. These policies are modeled to meet two important
targets in the benchmark economy, namely the share of rice land of 0.539 and the real quantity
of rice per capita of 64.36.
Rice Price Support - Table 4 compares key statistics generated by RLDP and suggested
targeting policies. Column 1 reports the results for the benchmark economy, which are similar
to those of Table 2 and 3. Column 2 provides the key statistics under rice price support
instead of RLDP in achieving the same level of rice land or output. Here, I abstract from
RLDP and introduce rice price support to the economy. The government taxes the household
with a lump-sum tax to finance the program. The support is modeled as a price subsidy of
rate η, thus changing the profit maximization problem of farmer i in producing rice from
equation (3) to the following,
πR(zi) = max
eR
{
(1 + η)pRκz
1−α
i e
α
Ri − qReRi
}
(35)
I then set the value of η to 0.91 and 0.41 such that the total share of rice land is 0.539 and
the real quantity of rice per capita is 64.36 as in the benchmark economy respectively. I find
that output-targeting price support is a better alternative underlined by an increase in GDP
per capita from $1,745 to $1,859, a difference of $102 compared to land targeting.
Relative Suitability Designation - The next set of policies focuses on redesigning RLDP.
I first abstract from the current RLDP. Then, I place restrictions on parcels of land based on
their rice to non-rice suitability ratios. To do so, I create a threshold such that parcels are
restricted to rice production if their suitability ratios are higher than this threshold. The
threshold is chosen so that the economy can achieve the benchmark level of rice land or
output. It takes a value of 1.64 and 1.02 to match the total share of rice land of 0.539 and
rice per capita of 64.36 respectively. Overall, I find that land targeting RLDP redesignation
is a better option as GDP per capita increases to $1,838.
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Table 4: Policy Options
Benchmark Price Relative Rice
Economy Support Suitability Suitability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Land Targeting Policies
Land and Labor Allocation
1. Share of rice land 0.539* 0.539* 0.539* 0.539*
2. Share of farmers 0.497 0.533 0.475 0.513
3. Average farm size 1.160 1.083 1.214 1.126
Productivity
1. Agricultural productivity TFPA 636 705 789 566
2. Farmer productivity YA/NA 668 724 842 587
3. GDP per capita 1,745 1,757 1,838 1697
Real Output per Capita
1. Rice 64.36 136.00 51.78 110.41
2. Other crops 99.63 92.93 129.57 71.09
3. Non-agricultural good 10,203 9,904 10,382 10,074
Panel B: Output Targeting Policies
Land and Labor Allocation
1. Share of rice land 0.539 0.378 0.709 0.394
2. Share of farmers 0.497 0.482 0.485 0.492
3. Average farm size 1.160 1.196 1.191 1.172
Productivity
1. Agricultural productivity TFPA 636 839 704 662
2. Farmer productivity YA/NA 668 890 746 698
3. GDP per capita 1,745 1,859 1,789 1763
Real Output per Capita
1. Rice 64.36* 64.36* 64.36* 64.36*
2. Other crops 99.63 135.65 110.55 103.97
3. Non-agricultural good 10,203 10,326 10,305 10,244
Notes: The asterisk (*) indicates the targets of rice land and rice quantity in the benchmark economy.
Rice Suitability Designation - The last group of policies is also about redesigning RLDP.
However, parcels of land are restricted based on rice suitability alone, instead of the suitability
ratio as in the previous group. Analogously, a threshold of rice suitability is created here.
The parcels, where rice suitabilities are higher than this threshold value, are restricted to
rice production. The threshold takes a value of 0.18 to match the share of rice land of 0.539,
and 0.32 to reproduce the amount of rice per capita of 64.36. Unlike relative suitability
designation, the results suggest that output targeting RLDP redesignation yields higher gains
emphasized by an increase in GDP per capita from $1,745 to $1,763.
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Overall, this exercise provides more productive alternatives to RLDP while still achieving
common goals. To attain the benchmark’s share of rice land, Vietnam should employ the
relative suitability designation (Panel A, Column 3). However, if the target is the benchmark
level of rice per capita, rice price support should be employed (Panel B, Column 2).
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Fixed Prices - An important concern is that Vietnam is not a big country nor is it closed.
Therefore, the price of goods might not be very sensitive to RLDP relaxation. To this end, I
explore the impacts of RLDP with output prices being fixed instead of considering a closed
economy. Row 2 of Table 5 provides key statistics from this sensitivity check including: (i)
the gain in agricultural productivity ∆TFPA, (ii) the gain in GDP per capita ∆GDP , and
(iii) the reduction in the total number of farmers ∆Farmer. Without the price changes
offsetting the gains from liberating RLDP, the results when prices being fixed are slightly
larger compared to the baseline results (Row 1). For example, eliminating RLDP in an open
economy raises GDP per capita by 8.38% instead of 8.03% as in the closed economy.
Fixed Labor Allocation - The model features two sources of reallocation after removing
RLDP, including: (i) the reallocation of land use across parcels raises agricultural productivity,
and (ii) the reassignment of individuals between sectors dampen the gain. It is also of interest
to investigate an economy where individuals are not allowed to move, i.e. abstracting the later
source. To do so, I simply fix the efficient number of farmers and workers at their benchmark
levels. The statistics reported in Row 3 suggest a larger gain in agricultural productivity
(39.29%) and a smaller increase in GDP per capita (7.47%) compared to those in Row 1. The
reason for the higher gain in agricultural productivity is that the average ability of farmers
is fixed instead of being reduced as in the baseline results. However, fixed labor allocation
prevents the movement of individuals to the more productive sector (non-agriculture), thus
lowering the gain in GDP compared to the baseline level.
Fixed Prices & Labor Allocation - Next, I examine the beneficial effects of removing
RLDP with both prices and labor allocation being fixed. This is the combination of the
first two exercises. The results are reported in Row 4. Without the offsetting effects of
both changes in prices and the reduction in average farmer ability, the gain in agricultural
productivity (40.97%) is higher than those in the previous exercises. However, without the
reallocation of labor to the more productive non-agriculture sector, the gain in GDP (7.79%)
36
is lower than the baseline level (8.03%), even after ruling out the offsetting effects. In either
case, the results with or without the offsetting effects (price and selection) are not much
different from each other.
Table 5: Main Results of Sensitivity Analysis
∆TFPA ∆GDP ∆Farmer
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Results +37.89% +8.03% -5.89%
Fixed Prices +39.40% +8.38% -6.49%
Fixed Labor Allocation +39.29% +7.47% -
Fixed Prices & Labor Allocation +40.97% +7.79% -
Parameter Values
α = 0.26 +28.43% +6.17% -4.68%
α = 0.40 +48.20% +9.97% -7.09%
β = 0.09 +37.17% +8.31% -9.10%
β = 0.13 +38.21% +7.92% -4.68%
ζ = 2.10 +37.40% +7.93% -5.88%
ζ = 3.10 +38.15% +8.10% -6.09%
Parameter Values - Three parameter values are either assigned or taken from outside
the model: land income share α, preference weight β, and elasticity of substitution across
agricultural goods ζ. While my choices of values are consistent and somewhat conservative,
it is still important to evaluate the sensitivity of the quantitative results. I do so by varying
the values of these parameters by around ±20% and recalibrating the economy to the same
targets as before. Row 5 to 10 report the results from these robustness checks.
As shown in the discussion of equation (24), the misallocation effects of RLDP is larger as
land becomes more important, and vice versa. Thus far, I have chosen the land elasticity
value of α = 0.33. Now, I change the value of α to 0.26 and 0.40. Indeed, the results are
quite sensitive to these changes. Reducing the value of α by 20% leads to changes in reported
statistics by around 23% on average. For example, the gain in agricultural TFP reduces to
28.43% when α = 0.26, and increases to 48.20% when α = 0.40. Since I set a conservative
value of α, it is unlikely that the misallocation effects are overestimated in the baseline results.
In the benchmark economy, the value of β = 0.11 is calibrated to the subsistence income
level marked by the Vietnamese government. Here, I want to examine how the gains respond
as β is moved to 0.09 or raised to 0.13. Note that a lower value of β means a higher
level of subsistence requirement, thus, suggesting a more responsive employment share (see
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equation (25) and its associated discussion). Consistent with the prediction, I find that the
misallocation effects on ∆TFPA and ∆GDP are slightly enlarged as I move β to 0.09, and
slightly reduced as β = 0.13. However, these fluctuations are insignificant in magnitude
compared to the impacts on ∆Farmer. Previous studies have assumed a value of β that is
closer or equal to zero, such as the works of Gollin et al. (2002, 2007) and Restuccia et al.
(2008). Therefore, the baseline gains can be considered as conservative.
For the elasticity of substitution across agricultural goods, I have set ζ = 2.63 as a midpoint
between the values documented in prior studies. Here, I allow ζ to take a value of 2.1 and
3.1 for the sensitivity checks. This range of value is much broader than the range suggested
by previous studies. However, I prefer a more extensive range because the preference for
rice is declining rapidly, e.g. a reduction of 32% in rice share of household food expenditure
over the period of 2002 - 2012 (World Bank 2016). In either case, I still observe substantial
misallocation effects that are not much different from the baseline results.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the impacts of Vietnam’s Rice Land Designation Policy on resource
allocation and productivity using micro-geographical data and household surveys over the
period of 2004 - 2014. In the theoretical framework, the restrictions on farmland not only lower
agricultural productivity but also prevent a share of labor from moving out of agriculture.
The main counterfactual experiment suggests that eliminating all land use restrictions leads
to an 8.03% increase in real GDP per capita. This improvement is indicated by a 40.68% gain
in agricultural labor productivity, a rise of 37.89% in agricultural TFP, a 5.89% reduction in
agricultural employment, and a 6.26% increase in average farm size. The sensitivity analysis
shows that the main results are unlikely to be inflated by the choices of parameter values.
While misallocation in agriculture has been studied extensively, the paper highlights a novel
source of misallocation prevalent in other countries such as China, Myanmar, Uzbekistan,
among others. Nevertheless, I cautiously note that the gain in productivity costs a non-
negligible loss in the total rice output. The novelty of RLDP is to ensure national food
security to cope with unexpected circumstances. Indeed, rice has been the primary subsidy
for people living below the national poverty line and those experiencing natural disasters.
Therefore, making appropriate adjustments regarding RLDP may require both economic and
political assessments.
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Appendix A
Figure A1: Spatial Distributions of Crop Yields
Notes: The figures above show the spatial distributions of the potential yields. The smallest spatial unit
is a parcel resulting from the process of intersection between GAEZ’s grid cells and LLUA’s polygons
(see Figure 2 and its discussion). The yields on agricultural land are divided into 4 quantiles, ranging
from light-green to dark-green. The white area is non-agricultural land.
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Figure A2: Land Quality Distribution: Restricted vs. Unrestricted
(a) Distribution of Rice Yield (b) Distribution of Non-rice Yield
(c) Distribution of Rice Yield (d) Distribution of Non-rice Yield
(e) Distribution of Rice Yield (f) Distribution of Non-rice Yield
Notes: The first two sub-figures show the cumulative distributions of rice and non-rice productivities
respectively. The second two sub-figures are the cumulative distributions of rice and non-rice productivities
on the restricted areas. The third two sub-figures depict the cumulative distributions of rice and non-rice
productivities on unrestricted areas.
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Figure A3: Farm Value-Added: Restricted vs. Unrestricted
(a) Distribution of Farms and Value-Added
(b) Distribution of Farms and Value-Added (log scale)
(c) Density Distribution of Farms and Value-Added (log scale)
Notes: The figures compare the distributions of farm value-added in the restricted economy to the ones
in the unrestricted economy, including: (a) the cumulative distributions of farm value-added, (b) the
cumulative distribution of log farm value-added, and (c) the probability density of log farm value-added.
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, I show that the model is unaffected by: (i) crop-specific subsidies given to rice
growers (as discussed in Section 2.3), and (ii) the inclusion of sectoral technology. I consider a more
extensive version of the model. Rice farmers receive subsidies in both output and input markets,
denoted by (1 + ηyR) and (1− η
l
R) respectively. Meanwhile, farmers of the other crops are subject to
both output and input taxes, denoted by (1− ηyO) and (1 + η
l
O) respectively. Besides, there exists a
crop-specific technology in producing rice (AR) and non-rice (AO). Farmer i profit maximization
problems are given by,
piR(zi) = max
eR
{
(1 + ηyR)p˜RκARz
1−α
i e
α
Ri − (1− η
l
R)qReRi
}
piO(zi) = max
eO
{
(1− ηyO)p˜OκAOz
1−α
i e
α
Oi − (1 + η
l
O)qOeOi
} (B1)
where p˜R and p˜O are the actual price of rice and non-rice respectively. The model price of rice
and non-rice {pR, pO} can be expressed as pR =
(1+ηy
R
)p˜RAR
(1−ηl
R
)α
and pO =
(1−ηy
O
)p˜OAO
(1+ηl
O
)α
. Therefore, I can
rewrite the profit maximization problems in (B1) as follows,
piR(zi) = max
eR
{
pRκz
1−α
i e
α
Ri − qReRi
}
piO(zi) = max
eO
{
pOκz
1−α
i e
α
Oi − qOeOi
} (B2)
The sets of maximization problems in (B1) and (B2) yield the same set of solutions, given by,

piR(zi) = zi
(
[(1 + ηyR)p˜RAR]
1/α
(1− ηlR)qR
) α
1−α
= zi
(
p
1/α
R
qR
) α
1−α
piO(zi) = zi
(
[(1− ηyO)p˜OAO]
1/α
(1 + ηlO)qO
) α
1−α
= zi
(
p
1/α
O
qO
) α
1−α
(B3)
In the main model, both crop choice and occupational choice are governed by the relative price
pR/pO (see Section 3.3 and 3.4). The relative price between rice and non-rice crop is given by,
pR
pO
=
p˜R
p˜O
[
AR
AO
(
1 + ηyR
1− ηyO
)(
1 + ηlO
1− ηlR
)α]
=
p˜R
p˜O
Ω (B4)
where Ω is the value inside the square brackets. The experiments conducted in the study concerns
removing RLDP only. In other words, the values of the parameters {AR, AO, η
y
R, η
l
R, η
y
O, η
l
O} are held
fixed; thus, Ω is constant. Any change in the relative price pR/pO reflects the change in the actual
relative price p˜R/p˜O. The same logic applies for the non-agriculture sector. Thus, the results are
unaffected by other taxes/subsidies and sectoral technologies.
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Appendix C
Table C1: Land Use Policies
Country Policy Description
Belarus Agricultural Production
Targets
The government dictates cropping requirements and
terminates use rights arbitrarily. The annual targets
(e.g. 9.2 million tons of grain and 4.8 million tonnes
of sugar beets in 2016) are passed down to regional
authorities, who in turn assign restrictions to farmers.
[Status: Effective since Soviet era]
Brazil Sugarcane
Agroecological Zoning
Forbidding sugarcane cultivation in 92.5% of the na-
tional territory to reduce adverse environmental im-
pacts. [Status: Effective since 2009 ]
China Responsibility Land In exchange for land use rights, farmers need to deliver
a mandatory quota of grain at a below-market price to
the authorities. The responsibility land accounts for
70% of total farmland in 2008. [Status: Effective since
1980s]
Egypt Agriculture Law
53/1966
The minister determines the areas to cultivate or to ban
certain crops. For example, 410,000 ha was banned
from rice cultivation to save water in 2018. Then,
almost 120,000 ha is lifted from the restriction in 2019.
[Status: Effective since 1988 ]
Indonesia Smallholders’ Sugarcane
Intensification
A land area of 350,000 ha is reserved for sugarcane
production to achieve self-sufficiency in sugar. [Status:
Effective since 2011 ]
Indonesia Development of
Agricultural Cluster
Areas
Agriculture Minister Decree No.830/2016 specifies
which provincial districts will develop which commod-
ity production. [Status: Effective since 2016 ]
Japan Acreage Control The government issues a set-aside area to each pre-
fecture for rice cultivation. The set-aside area was
switched to production quotas in 2004. [Status: Effec-
tive during 1970-2018 ]
Kenya Crops Act Farmers must be licensed in order to cultivate
government-scheduled crops (e.g. maize, beans, and
rice). [Status: Effective since 2013 ]
Lao PDR Rice Land Designation The National Assembly requires 2 million ha (45%) of
agricultural land to be under rice cultivation. [Status:
Effective since 2018 ]
Malawi Special Crops Act Smallholders are restricted from growing certain crops
(mostly tobacco and tea). [Status: Effective during
1963-1994 ]
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Country Policy Description
Myanmar Programming
Agricultural Output
Farmers in the program area are restricted only to
rice. They are also required to deliver a predetermined
quantity to the state (about 20% of output). [Status:
Effective since the Burmese Way to Socialism era]
Nepal Land Use Zoning Land will be categorized on the basis of geographical
structure, nature, and its capacity. The land classified
for one purpose will be prohibited to use for another
purpose (the lowest level of purpose is crop-by-season).
[Status: Effective from 2020 expectedly ]
Nigeria Nigerian Sugar Master
Plan
An additional 250,000 ha is reserved for sugarcane
production to achieve self-sufficiency in sugar. [Status:
Effective since 2013 ]
Rwanda Crop Intensification
Program
All farmers with closed parcels are required to grow
only eight priority food crops to food security. [Status:
Effective since 2007 ]
Tajikistan State Orders The state enforced quotas on cotton regulated that
at least 70% of agricultural land had to be cultivated
with cotton. Although the quotas no longer exist on
paper, many regional authorities still follow the 70%
rule. [Status: Effective during 1995-2009 ]
Thailand Agricultural Crop
Zoning System
The government uses zoning to set specific areas for
specific crop production. The objective is to balance
supply with demand, promote suitable land use, reduce
crop price instability; and develop a systematic control
at the provincial level. [Status: Initiated in 2012 ]
Turkmenistan State Orders The government sets quotas and specifies required
crop production (almost universally cotton or wheat)
on each allocated plot. Land use rights can be revoked
for not following the state’s orders on cropping and
production. [Status: Effective since 1997 ]
Uzbekistan State Orders Each year, the government assigns targets for cotton
and wheat production to local governments, who in
turn issue quotas to farmers. Failure to meet the quotas
may lead to criminal prosecution and land confiscation.
[Status: Effective since Soviet era]
Zimbabwe Command Agriculture A contract farming system aimed at ensuring food
self-sufficiency by contracting farmers to produce the
specified crops. A land area of 290,000 and 50,000 ha
is targeted for maize and rice production respectively.
[Status: Effective since 2016 ]
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Appendix D
The occupational choice, jointly regulated by γ1 and the distortion τ , can be further divided into
two types: (i) a random distortion due to τ with γ1 = 0, and (ii) correlated distortion due to the
combination of τ with γ1 6= 0. To explore the relative magnitude of these two channels, I set γ1 = 0,
resolve the model, and compare relevant statistics with the benchmark economy (where γ1 = −0.63).
The results of this exercise are reported in Table D1. Without the selection effect, individuals
randomly allocated to the two sectors. Consequently, farmer productivity increases by 89.97% and
worker productivity decreases by 33.78%. Overall, GDP per capita is higher in the benchmark
economy under the presence of correlated distortion. Intuitively, the economy should perform better
when high-ability individuals face fewer distortions (mobility barrier to non-agriculture in this case).
Table D1: The Relative Magnitude between Correlated and Random Distortions
γ1 = −0.63 γ1 = 0 Change (%)
(1) (2) (3)
1. Share of farmers 0.497 0.310 -37.69%
2. Agricultural productivity TFPA 636 1,033 +62.51%
3. Agricultural GDP per farmer 668 1,268 +89.97%
4. Non-agricultural GDP per worker 2,812 1,862 +33.78%
5. GDP per capita 1,745 1,678 -3.84%
Regarding how the two parameters are identified, I assume a uniform distribution in the range
of [0, 1] for τ (with τmax = 1), then set γ1 = −0.63 to match the sectoral productivity gap. The
distribution and the range of τ are chosen arbitrarily here (similar to Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas
(2014)). The relationship between γ1 and the range of τ is illustrated in Figure D1. The smaller the
range of τ , the higher the absolute value of γ1 required to match the sectoral productivity gap. The
baseline results remain unchanged regardless of different combinations of {τmax, γ1}.
Instead of assuming a joint cdf H(z, τ), there are different approaches taken by prior studies. For
example, I can have just one common fixed cost of mobility, such as the work of Adamopoulos and
Restuccia (2014a). However, doing so will change the shape of individual ability distribution when
requiring the model to reproduce the distribution of individual earnings. The ability distribution
would be discontinuous at the threshold of occupational choice, with the lowest ability of non-
agricultural workers being higher than the highest ability of farmers. Another approach is to have a
joint distribution of agricultural and non-agricultural ability as implemented in Lagakos and Waugh
(2013) and Adamopoulos et al. (2017). This approach will require two more moments for the model
to match relevant targets (the sectoral earnings correlation and the dispersion in non-agricultural
earnings). Since my focus is land use misallocation in agriculture and the transition of labor out
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of agriculture, I shy away from the second method to avoid unnecessary complications. Therefore,
as in Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014), I prefer the use of the idiosyncratic distortion for
two reasons: (i) it provides a straightforward setup in this context, and (ii) it allows for an extra
degree of freedom in reproducing individual earnings, thus keeping the ability distribution from
being compromised.
Figure D1: The relationship between γ1 and τmax
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